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The article deals with the membership of the most important Czech political party, aNO 
(meaning “yes” in Czech), led by andrej Babiš, in the alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for europe (aLDe). Our goals are to reconstruct how Babiš’s party joined 
aLDe and to discuss the ideological differences between aNO and aLDe. The paper 
shows that aLDe’s offer of membership in 2014 was motivated by a pragmatic need to 
bolster its own position in the european Parliament; aNO, meanwhile, needed to anchor 
itself in european politics. andrej Babiš’s technocratic and illiberal view was not appar-
ent at the beginning, but more importantly, this did not matter to aLDe. aLDe’s Czech 
“point of contact,” aNO’s foreign policy expert and the leader of its party group in the 
european Parliament, Pavel Telička, made aNO’s membership credible. However, as a 
euro-optimist, Telička was not compatible with aNO’s flexible ideological character in 
the long term and the party group split up. a comparison of the parties’ european 
Parliament election manifestos and positions on crucial controversial european issues 
clearly reveals a deep division between aLDe and aNO—and their fundamentally 
opposed ideological positions. We describe the findings as a new hyper-pragmatic trend 
in the creation of europarties, which weakens their ideological cohesion.
Keywords: Andrej Babiš; the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe 
(ALDE); ideology; Europarties; Czech Republic
Introduction
In their seminal work on political parties at the level of the european Union 
(europarties), Simon Hix and Christopher Lord used without many reservations the 
concept of familles spirituelles to cover diverse groupings in the european Parliament 
(eP) and beyond.1 Together with the european People’s Party (ePP) and the 
european Socialists (PeS), the liberal party family is among the longest existing of 
these “families.” even though the liberals have always been internally diverse, they 
nevertheless used to be connected by a shared, coherent set of ideological beliefs. 
For pragmatic political reasons, the liberal group was always open to participation 
by some parties that did not strictly belong to the liberal tradition, such as some 
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originally agrarian Nordic parties—for example, the Finnish KeSK—the Spanish 
Democratic and Social Centre (1989–1994), and the Italian Lega Nord (1994–
1999).2 even these parties, however, exhibited a solid liberal “flavour” during their 
period of membership, or at least they were not in sharp conflict with liberal values. 
Clear limits of acceptability were shown in summer 1995 when Forza Italia’s mem-
bership application was rejected.3
More than two decades later, however, it seems that ideological cohesion is even 
less important, and that pragmatism has overruled policy and ideological proximi-
ties. One of the reasons, according to some observers, is the eastern enlargement of 
the eU causing the “further dilution of [the] ideological homogeneity” of the 
europarties.4 Before we endorse this explanation, we shall examine an empirical 
example of a “strange marriage” between a liberal europarty and a Central and 
eastern european party that does not fit clearly into the liberal famille spirituelle. We 
selected the case of cooperation between the alliance of Liberals and Democrats for 
europe (aLDe) and the Czech party aNO (the name means “yes” in Czech). This 
case allows us to test the theoretical assumptions about cooperation within the 
europarties. Our research questions are, Why did aNO join aLDe in 2014 and why 
did it remain in aLDe despite the increasing ideological and political divergence 
between them? answers to both questions help us to understand their motivations, 
and, at the same time, make it possible to identify the dynamics of the relationship. 
Without an analysis of these dynamics, it is not possible to explain the ongoing mem-
bership of aNO in aLDe.
Why study the relationship between a Czech party and a europarty? The reason 
is that aNO is currently one of the most successful—perhaps the most success-
ful—of a number of similar parties in Central and eastern europe, including the 
Slovenian Modern Centre Party and the Lithuanian Labour Party. These are entre-
preneurial parties without a clear and solid ideology (a detailed explanation of this 
type of party is provided below). They use aLDe as a source of legitimacy and as 
a fast route to power, that is, to achieve a greater importance at the eU level. This 
article gives the reader a better grasp of how the europarties’ views of who is 
(still) acceptable as a member has changed over time, and how much the former 
balance between a shared ideology and pragmatism has tipped in favour of the 
latter.
We first discuss the liberal party family and its ideology, and the theoretical litera-
ture on the relations between europarties and political parties in eU member coun-
tries, with an emphasis on liberal parties. This is followed by an introduction to 
aNO, its origin and illiberal profile, and a comparison of aNO and aLDe positions. 
We ask whether there were ideological differences between aNO and aLDe, and 
what they consisted of. Related to this, we discuss the problems of the aNO leader, 
andrej Babiš, linked with his business and his past and that have significantly influ-
enced the party’s activities in Czech politics. We also analyse how these problems 
have affected the aLDe-aNO relationship.
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In terms of method, the article is inspired by process tracing, specifically that vari-
ant that aims to explain the outcome of a unique process5—in our case, aLDe-aNO 
cooperation. The aim is not to find the generic variables that cause pragmatic coop-
eration between parties despite their ideological disagreements and contrasts, but to 
show those specific moments, actors, and decisions that led to the creation and main-
tenance of the partnership. In order to understand the aLDe-aNO relationship, we 
need a chronological analysis of the evolution of their cooperation—but we need to 
investigate their ideological and programmatic agreements and disagreements, too. 
For that reason, beyond primary data from the media, we also investigate program-
matic documents and selected political positions as communicated by aNO and 
aLDe politicians.
Making a Match: Ideology or Pragmatism?
Thanks to its long history, reaching back to the birth of modern capitalist socie-
ties, liberal ideology is a very varied phenomenon, and this has influenced the char-
acter of liberal political parties. Despite this, as gordon Smith emphasizes, liberal 
parties maintain “their connections with two original tenets of liberal ideology, the 
two freedoms: economic freedom and the liberties of the individual.”6 Precisely 
these two freedoms—one of them economic, the other cultural—were historically 
important for the identity of liberal parties, distinguishing them from other party 
families. Support for the free market and market economies moved liberals away 
from socialists on the left, and, conversely, individual freedom linked with anti-
clericalism drove them away from conservatives and Christian democrats on the 
right wing of the political spectrum. as time passed and the contexts of individual 
countries varied, the understanding of these two freedoms was subject to change: for 
instance, in the cultural dimension, issues such as the rights of various minorities and 
same-sex marriage came to the fore, replacing anti-clericalism.
Yet these two freedoms are an important feature of the heterogeneity of liber-
als, dividing them into two groups according to the key element of their identity. 
The first group is made up primarily of economic pro-market parties, which want 
to minimize state intervention. The cultural dimension is not that important for 
them and they might be ambivalent towards it. The second group comprises 
social-liberal parties that are oriented more on the cultural dimension and, by 
contrast, are not as focused on the economy (they often advocate a moderate, 
rather than strong, pro-free-market position). This division may exist within a 
single country: for instance, in the Netherlands there are the classic economic 
liberals, the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) as well as the 
social liberals, Democrats 66. The terminology used to describe these two groups 
is not universally applied; in addition to the common expressions “classic liber-
als” and “social liberals,” scholars such as Klaus von Beyme and gordon Smith 
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use the terms “conservative liberals” and “radical liberals,” reflecting the latter 
group’s historical links with political radicalism.7
Recent studies show that the role of the cultural dimension as a cleavage in 
european politics is on the increase.8 But here a problem arises for aLDe, which is 
primarily known for including several Central and eastern european parties. Caroline 
Close argues that in addition to the economic and social liberals, there is a third 
group, “characterised by a centrist position on the economic axis combined with a 
more centre-right position on the cultural axis.”9 Yet most of the Central and eastern 
european parties classified into this group, such as the Lithuanian Labour Party and 
Czech aNO, are ambiguous or populist in their economic policies as well as on cul-
tural issues, where their degree of intolerance and nationalism occasionally reach 
levels commonly witnessed on the far right. What is crucial for these parties is not 
ideology, but hyper-pragmatism; often they are entrepreneurial parties who approach 
voters as consumers of politics, and offer what is in demand at any given moment.10
The formation of supranational links by liberals is often seen as similar to what 
happened with other earlier party families. according to Stefano Bartolini, despite 
all the diverging attitudes, it was ideological beliefs, shared “genetics,” and gener-
ally the structure of cleavages that shaped the formation of europarties.11 The 
eastern enlargement of the eU brought in parties that originated in a specific post-
communist context, which, by their integration into european structures, might 
have weakened the ideological and political coherence of the existing europarties.12 
The argument that the eastern enlargement caused the “further dilution of [the] 
ideological homogeneity” of the europarties has to be analysed further, however, 
before we embark on an empirical analysis.13 The argument has been contradicted 
by other researchers, who confirmed the persistent importance and presence of 
ideological coherence within the main europarties. edoardo Bressanelli showed 
that even in the then eU-27, “ideology or policy compatibility is the main factor 
behind group membership.”14 This applies mainly to the biggest europarties, ePP 
and PeS, but to a lesser extent aLDe as well. Studies of political groups’ cohesion 
during voting in the eP also show that, together with the ePP and PeS, the Liberals 
are among the “genuine” europarties, demonstrating in the long-term perspective 
a higher level of cohesion than other europarties.15 Yet this voting cohesion is not 
necessarily a product of ideological coherence—it could be a demonstration of 
pragmatic behaviour in the eP—and hence we need to compare the aNO and 
aLDe programmes as well.
The Liberal europarty functioned as one of the safest and most open interna-
tional sanctuaries for parties from the post-communist countries. In 1997, eLDR 
(the predecessor of aLDe) was the first europarty to offer full membership status 
to the Central and eastern european parties before the official start of the “big 
bang” enlargement. Some liberal parties, such as the Polish Freedom Union, 
decided to join the bigger—and from the point of view of power and influence, 
more attractive—ePP, but for the vast majority of Central and eastern european 
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liberals before and after 2004, eLDR/aLDe was the natural option. This con-
firmed a general observation: ideology as well as party families’ proximities matter 
in Central and eastern europe too. erol Külahci mentioned that despite the relative 
internal ideological diversity of the liberals compared to some other parties, ideol-
ogy (with a strong pro-integration position) remains the crucial criterion even 
within this party family.16 In general, even after 2004, that is, in the first years after 
the eastern enlargement, “ideological location” and the “genetic model” have 
remained stronger than pragmatic strategic reasons if one seeks an explanation as 
to why the national parties choose europarties and vice versa.
We argue that the “marriage” between aNO and aLDe contradicts this prevailing 
assumption of the dominance of ideological proximity within the liberal famille spi-
rituelle. We will demonstrate that these parties “matched” each other for purely prac-
tical reasons, that there was a great deal of personal diplomacy involved in this 
process, and that there is decreasing policy coherence between the Czech aNO and 
the Liberal europarty. We will propose that this cooperation goes beyond the typical 
“marriage of convenience” and that it shows a trend towards hyper-pragmatism. 
Before we demonstrate this in detail, we will introduce the aNO party.
A Technocrat with an Illiberal Vision
In 2011, andrej Babiš, a billionaire of Slovak origin, first established the civic 
association “action of Dissatisfied Citizens” (Akce nespokojených občanů [aNO]), 
and then started a political party using the acronym as its name. a window of oppor-
tunity was opened for aNO by the collapse of public trust in existing party politics 
in Czechia, to which was added the economic recession and many affairs, climaxing 
in the fall of a centre-right government in scandal.17 Babiš’s party then polled nearly 
19 per cent of the vote in the early elections in 2013, placing second. after the elec-
tions, aNO governed with the Social Democrats—the winner of the elections—with 
the Christian Democrats as junior partner in the coalition. Babiš became deputy 
prime minister and minister of finance. aNO went on to win the next elections in 
2017, taking about 30 per cent of the vote. Babiš became the prime minister, first of 
a minority single-party government that failed to win the parliament’s confidence 
and then an aNO-Social Democrat minority coalition.
aNO can be considered an entrepreneurial party, that is, “a project of a political 
entrepreneur who connects his economic and political interests, who commands 
and organizes the party in a hierarchical and centralized way using business logic 
and approaches both in organisation and in political campaigning.”18 aNO is close 
to the classic example, Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia; however, this party species 
is quite diverse and the party leaders sometimes lack substantial business resources 
(e.g., geert Wilders’s Party for Freedom in the Netherlands and Carl Hagen’s 
Progress Party in Norway).19
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In building his party, Babiš relied on his virtually unlimited finances, as well as 
the personnel and assets of his agricultural and chemical business empire, agrofert. 
external electoral and marketing experts, initially hired on a temporary basis, became 
a permanent electoral-professional staff, running aNO election campaigns. The par-
ty’s political communications were supported by the agrofert media empire, even 
though it was not formally part of the party organization.20 The organizational struc-
ture was strictly centralized, with the leader and the inner circle around him as the 
focal point.21 aNO’s relatively high level of homogeneity was further supported by 
the common managerial and business origins of most of the party elite.22
Cadre loyalty to the leader was important because of the conflict of interests that 
came from combining government office with his ownership of agrofert, eco-
nomic interests, and substantial media power. Babiš was forced by an amendment 
to the Conflict of Interests act to relinquish his ownership of agrofert, which he 
transferred to a trust funds in 2017. Despite this, the aNO leader has continued to 
control agrofert indirectly, and discussion of his conflict of interests has continued 
in Czechia and at the eU level. Babiš’s older financial “sins” also remain politi-
cally explosive.
Babiš’s anti-corruption and anti-party rhetoric secured aNO’s initial success. He 
branded older parties corrupt and incompetent, and perpetrators of state dysfunc-
tion.23 at the same time, Babiš offered a purely technocratic, managerial vision, in 
which the state would be managed in a competent manner. This vision became the 
permanent core of aNO’s identity.
Babiš’s technocratism is best expressed in a key slogan that he has used since the 
very beginnings of aNO: “To manage the state like a firm” (Řídit stát jako firmu). He 
argued that a technocratic management style carried over from the private sector 
would allow the state to function efficiently, especially by allowing for simpler and 
quicker expert decision making, without “unnecessary” oversight mechanisms. This 
technocratism, adroitly combined with populism, became the main source of politi-
cal legitimacy for Babiš’s aNO.24
But by its very nature, technocratism is in latent conflict with liberal democracy, 
not least because of its anti-plural scepticism, its idea of depoliticization policies 
without clashes of interests, and its allegedly neutral non-ideological pragmatism.25 
a liberal (constitutional) democracy is usually understood as a combination of 
democracy based on elections with liberal elements. For instance, Fareed Zakaria 
defines a liberal democracy as “a political system marked not only by free and fair 
elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of 
[the] basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion and property.”26 Babiš’s aNO pre-
sented notions that in many respects tended towards what Zakaria describes as an 
illiberal democracy—one that is divested of liberal elements—because Babiš was 
focused on the maximum concentration of power for the sake of efficiency.
Illiberal ideas have not been present in aNO manifestos, which have been con-
ceived as something like “shopping lists” for voters. Contrariwise, illiberal elements 
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have been typical of the leader’s rhetoric and positions, for example, Babiš’s under-
standing of the relationship between the executive and the legislature. He dismissed 
parliament as a “blather house” (žvanírna) and his ideal was a one-party majority 
government on which minimal limits would be imposed.27 Babiš outlines his notion 
of changing the country’s political regime most comprehensively in the book What I 
Dream about When I Happen to Fall Asleep, used by aNO as one of its lures in the 
2017 election campaign. The book points out the lengthy legislative process and the 
instability and inefficiency of governance, and then suggests measures that would 
improve the situation. These would be extensive, including the abolition of “harm-
ful” institutions such as regional governments and the upper chamber of parliament, 
halving the number of MPs and making changes to parliamentary procedure aimed 
at curtailing debate.28
aNO cannot be placed in any party family, and certainly not among liberals. 
Political scientists who have analysed aNO’s profile differ somewhat in their termi-
nology, but there is consensus that Babiš has a technocratic vision of illiberal democ-
racy.29 Vlastimil Havlík and Věra Stojarová aptly note: “Babiš presented the idea of 
politics as a business with a strong leader (the owner of a company) surrounded by 
loyal supporters and (unlimited) concentrated executive power as an alternative to a 
liberal democratic parliamentarism.”30 When analysing aNO’s positions on the 
migration crisis, we will see that the idea of human rights is likewise far from being 
taken seriously by Babiš’s party. The illiberal essence of aNO is in no way altered by 
the fact that because of the system of coalition governance in Czechia, it does not 
have many options for putting these ideas into practice.
An Expedient Choice: Contacts Matter!
During the aNO foundational period, Pavel Telička was andrej Babiš’s key link 
with the european Union and his main adviser on eU matters. Telička had many 
years’ experience with european affairs: during the 1990s, he was in the Czech 
Foreign affairs Ministry’s permanent mission in the eU; later, as State Secretary 
for european affairs, he led the Czech team during accession negotiations; imme-
diately after the Czech accession to the eU in 2004 he served as european 
Commissioner for several months. He then moved into business and co-owned a 
lobbying firm in Brussels.
Telička started to work closely with Babiš in 2012 and was even offered the job of 
aNO formal leader, which he declined.31 Here it needs noting that in the early days 
of his party, andrej Babiš considered his personal profile too controversial (not least 
because he was suspected of having collaborated with the communist secret police 
before 1989) and for some time he was looking for a publicly more acceptable figure 
to head aNO. Testifying to Babiš’s trust in Telička is the fact that in autumn 2013 he 
made him the leader of the candidate list for the european elections and gave him a 
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free hand in drafting the party’s manifesto and selecting other candidates.32 The 
bizarre side effect of this was that none of the four aNO MePs elected in May 2014, 
including Telička, was formally a member of the party. In Babiš’s technocratic think-
ing, this posed no problem. aNO won the 2014 eP elections, but only took 16 per 
cent of the vote.
Telička was the contact through which aLDe politicians, and especially the chair 
of its parliamentary group and former Belgian prime minister, guy Verhofstadt, 
started to probe aNO. aLDe was interested in involving Babiš’s party immediately 
after the latter’s success in Czech parliamentary elections in October 2013. Telička 
was previously an official in cabinets led by the Social Democrats in particular, but 
he had no strong links with that party. a rapprochement with aLDe made sense for 
aNO. It was a mainstream europarty, with the third-strongest parliamentary group 
after the european People’s Party and the european Socialists, of which some Czech 
parties were already members. aLDe was liberal and reform-oriented, which, in the 
early days of aNO, corresponded with the rhetoric employed by Babiš and other 
aNO representatives, at least to a certain extent.
Similarly, from the viewpoint of aLDe and its eP group, it made sense for aNO 
to become a member, because aLDe had no Czech party. In the past, several Czech 
parties had been members of aLDe or its predecessor, the eLDR, but they either had 
no political relevance or lost it. The most recent Czech aLDe member, LIDeM, 
founded in 2012 by seceding from another party, was virtually inactive at the time of 
aNO’s rise. Verhofstadt visited Prague in March 2014 and Babiš was appreciative: 
“We found many common topics,” he would say; they had “many shared opinions.”33 
Babiš and Verhofstadt agreed in particular on the need to fight corruption—a crucial 
issue for the aNO leader at the time. During the negotiations, Verhofstadt revealed 
his somewhat pragmatic motivation by admitting to journalists: “I’ve never met any-
one from the [LIDeM] party” and “they are no longer aLDe members because they 
failed to pay their dues.”34
Similarly, Telička confessed his pragmatism in an interview: “I admit that it was 
something of a calculation on our side. If I emphasize that we want to be active in the 
european Parliament and want to change something, then in a larger parliamentary 
group, we would not have such an influence as in a smaller group. But of course the 
premise must continue to hold that aLDe will be the third strongest group in the 
european Parliament after the elections.”35 Telička also admitted that aLDe was the 
only group to approach aNO.
Verhofstadt’s response to the question of whether he considered Babiš an oligarch 
is also worthy of quotation. “an oligarch is someone who owes his economic empire 
to political links, which is the very opposite of Mr Babiš, who had built his position 
from the ground up. He certainly is no Berlusconi. The main characteristics of a good 
politician are honesty and a will to change things and . . . Mr Babiš has both.”36 
Several days later, Verhofstadt stood up for Babiš, in the context of the debate about 
Babiš’s conflict of interests, which was just beginning. at the eU level, the debate 
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was started by Ingeborg grässle (ePP), a member of the eP’s Committee on 
Budgetary Control, who criticized agrofert firms for drawing money from european 
funds, while Babiš, as Minister of Finance, guaranteed that this drawdown was 
proper. according to Verhofstadt’s proclamation on the matter, no “politically biased 
and unfounded accusations” should be disseminated.37 These very accommodating 
positions of the aLDe leader were evidently influenced by the looming european 
elections and Verhofstadt’s efforts to woo a new partner in Czechia. Verhofstadt’s 
attempts to relativize or diminish the problems linked with Babiš were completely 
unchanged for several more years.
Babiš’s understanding of the eU was very narrow. In addition to its aid in fighting 
tax fraud—a major domestic priority for Babiš—he most often emphasized the con-
tributions made by european funds. In one of his not very frequent mentions of 
aLDe, shortly after the aNO party congress in 2015, he put it simply:
I am for the eU for pragmatic reasons. . . . Thanks to it, the Czech Republic is more 
than 89 billion crowns (more than €3 billion) in credit from european funds. We, aNO, 
have four members of european Parliament, each of them speaks many languages, and 
Telička’s contacts in Brussels are perfect. What is more, we are in the aLDe liberal 
group, which is chaired by the former Belgian Prime Minister, Verhofstadt. He for his 
part knows many people.38
Thus, aLDe was for Babiš only one useful tool for promoting his interests in the 
eU, and one that did not tie his hands in any significant way.
The negotiations for the accession of future aNO MePs to the aLDe group in the 
eP were completed even before the 2014 european elections, and were smoothly 
approved by the group after the elections. aNO formally applied for aLDe member-
ship on 2 June 2014 and was approved at the europarty’s congress on 21 November. 
The involvement in aLDe has had tangible benefits for aNO in terms of positions: 
for example, in January 2017, Telička was elected an eP vice president.
A Comparison of ANO and ALDE Manifestoes
Woulter Wolfs and Steven van Hecke note in their analysis of aLDe that over 
time the europarty has faced “growing difficulties to adopt a common electoral 
platform for the elections for the eP, particularly as the number of member parties 
increases.”39 The clashes between classic and social liberals have been strong. The 
aLDe manifesto for the 2014 eP elections had a pro-market orientation, which 
tended to accentuate the ideas of classic liberals.40 Further, a very strong emphasis 
was put on “building a stronger europe to defend our common interests and val-
ues.”41 This corresponds to the long-established pro-european orientation of aLDe 
and of nearly all liberal parties.
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The 2014 aNO manifesto for eP elections was also written in a pro-european and 
reform-minded spirit:
From the historical, contemporary and future viewpoints, it is therefore difficult to find 
a national interest more important for our Central european country than a stable and 
economically successful eU. History teaches us that stability and prosperity do not 
come as a matter of course, but that we must always struggle for them. elections to the 
eP, like the elections to the [Czech] Chamber of Deputies before, are an opportunity to 
bring a new impulse, strength and ability to influence the character of the Union and 
the position of our country in it. . . . a stable and economically successful eU is there-
fore the foremost Czech geopolitical and economic interest.42
In the manifesto’s particular points, however, rhetoric prevailed of defending 
Czech national interests and of how the eU could or could not help the Czech 
economy develop. The document’s very extensive introduction was a critique of 
preceding Czech governments, not a programme oriented towards the future.
Simply put, while aLDe placed emphasis on “more europe,” aNO was equivo-
cal in order to allow the major part of the Czech population, which had long been 
eurosceptic, to identify with its manifesto. Yet the two manifestos were not in obvi-
ous collision. This could also be seen in the sections on the economy, where aNO 
agreed with aLDe in supporting economic liberalism as well as in other points, such 
as the need to reform the Common agricultural Policy. This was evidently due in part 
to the fact that aLDe presented its manifesto at a party congress in November 2013, 
while the aNO manifesto was only unveiled in February 2014. Thus, Telička, who 
had been the electoral leader since the autumn, could refer to the aLDe manifesto 
when preparing the aNO strategy.
aLDe presented its manifesto for the 2019 eP elections as early as its congress 
in November 2018, whereas aNO did so only in early May 2019, that is, shortly 
before the elections. a comparison immediately reveals much less correspon-
dence than five years previously. Let us first look at the aLDe manifesto, which 
was much more emotive than its predecessor, stating that “the liberal vision is one 
built around a free, democratic, entrepreneurial, prosperous, sustainable and 
united europe open to the world.”43 The manifesto appealed to liberal values, 
protection of minority rights and human rights generally, non-discrimination, and 
the need actively to fight non-liberal political forces. even economic liberalism 
was framed as the protection of economic freedoms against harmful protection-
ism. The hot-button issue of migration and refugees was now an important point 
in the manifesto in terms of emphasizing protection of “all those that are fleeing 
the horrors of war or the pain of political repression.”44
While aLDe emphasized strengthening the eU and the need to defend and dis-
seminate liberal values, aNO tended to take the opposite approach in its manifesto. 
according to aNO’s 2019 manifesto, it was not liberal values, but Czechs that 
needed defending:
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It is clear that the eU is a great project. It has brought peace, security and prosperity to 
our continent. . . . But as you must have noticed recently, the Union occasionally loses 
steam and the european Commission sometimes behaves incomprehensibly and illogi-
cally. Yes, some of the things that come from the eU are lacking in common sense. Yes, 
these are things that are not right and advantageous for us. We will therefore do every-
thing to protect our country and our people from the threats of our times, from every-
thing that is not fair and that might complicate our lives. and our dreams. We will do 
everything so that we are not second-category europeans.45
When we compare aNO manifestos for the 2014 and the 2019 eP elections, we can 
see a clear shift in the framing in the direction of soft euroscepticism. The headline 
of the 2019 manifesto was telling: “We will protect Czechia. Strictly and without 
compromise.” The preamble used suggestive language of global threats endangering 
the “splendid country” of the Czech Republic. The eU needs “profound reform”: 
less power but greater efficiency, reinforcing intergovernmental institutions at the 
expense of supranational ones.
Comparing the aNO and aLDe positions as outlined in their 2019 manifestos, we 
see very important differences and, in some points, opposing preferences. This can 
be shown by their approaches to migration policy. Concerning the mandatory quotas 
for allocating refugees, which were exceptionally unpopular in a Czechia not affected 
by an influx of refugees, aNO emphasized: “Thanks to us they were rejected in June 
2018, and so it shall remain. We also insist that national authorities must decide about 
legal economic migration, for instance in connection with the needs of the domestic 
economy.”46 To sum up, aNO has fundamentally split from the european liberals on 
issues of values, society and culture.
Integration, Brexit and the Refugee Crisis
Let us now look at some major european topics of the 2014–2019 period, where 
the views of aLDe and aNO conflicted, and how aNO MePs, sometimes with great 
difficulty, navigated these issues. Babiš’s position on greece was visibly disruptive. 
During the mid-2010s, the country was still dealing with a deep economic and finan-
cial crisis, and this was linked with a debate on the functioning of the eurozone. 
aLDe officially advocated keeping greece in the eurozone, and Verhofstadt spoke 
about a radical liberal treatment, including slimming down the public sector. Babiš 
was no less radical, but in an entirely different way. He claimed in the Czech public 
debate that greece should leave the eurozone and “finally go bankrupt . . . so that 
space is cleared.”47
Babiš resisted Czechia adopting the euro currency. In this, he fully agreed with the 
long-standing prevailing opinion of his compatriots. For instance, an april 2015 
CVVM poll revealed that nearly 70 per cent of Czechs were against adopting the 
euro, and four years later the number was even slightly higher.48 In aNO’s strategy, 
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which understands voters as consumers to whom the party is selling a product, the 
negative position on euro adoption made sense. It is worth noting, though, that MeP 
Telička has been involved in various debates about the euro and described himself as 
its advocate, even if he proposed not to hurry into adoption.49
Brexit has been another important european issue. For aLDe, the UK’s departure 
was an opportunity to strengthen federalist tendencies in the eU and the role of the 
eP. It is unsurprising that in September 2016 guy Verhofstadt was elected the chair 
of the eP’s Brexit Steering group and on assuming the office proclaimed that the eP 
should play a major role in the negotiations between the UK and eU, because as a 
directly elected institution it had much greater legitimacy to defend the interests of 
eU citizens as a whole than the individual member states did.50 This position directly 
contradicted Babiš’s permanent emphasis on the role of intergovernmental institu-
tions and member states.
In a later comment, Verhofstadt described Brexit as part of the populist wave in 
europe and even went on to recommend to British politicians “[a] cultural shift 
toward an eU-style ‘co-decision’ process,” because “if British political leaders are to 
have any hope of uniting their bitterly divided country, they will have to lead by 
example.”51 aLDe’s official position on Brexit was expressed in a December 2017 
resolution. It supported the eU’s united stance and the efforts of the British Liberal 
Democrats to call for a second referendum that would include the option of rejecting 
Brexit. However, the resolution also argued that there was “the need for the eU insti-
tutions and for politicians at all levels to communicate better the positive impact that 
eU membership has had and continues to have on member states and its citizens.”52
Babiš’s temperament, by contrast, manifested itself clearly and symptomatically 
shortly after the British referendum on leaving the eU. at a conference organized by 
his party’s think-tank, he said that if he were in the position of the British, he would 
“perhaps vote for exit.”53 He justified this by references to the following: Brussels 
bureaucracy; his favourite argument—money, that is—and what he saw as excessive 
British contributions to the eU budget; and the eU’s inability to resolve the refugee 
crisis. Curiously enough, one of the speakers was Verhofstadt, while Telička, who 
moderated the conference, sought to dampen Babiš’s words by saying that it was 
only his personal opinion. The position of aNO MePs, by contrast, largely con-
formed to that of aLDe from the very beginning.54
as far as the refugee crisis, which climaxed in 2015, was concerned: in May 2014 
an aLDe resolution called for much stronger support for Syrian refugees.55 at the 
peak of the crisis, aLDe appealed to the “[m]ember states and the eU to replace the 
Dublin system by a eU distribution system that would allocate refugees between 
member states.”56 aLDe also continued to see the refugee crisis as a humanitarian 
problem and an opportunity.57 aLDe’s position was directly contradicted by aNO’s 
heightened securitization rhetoric and rejection of any (compulsory or voluntary) 
allocation of refugees.58 Initially, the aNO leader declared that refugees could help 
resolve the Czech problem of worker shortages in jobs that the Czechs did not want 
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due to low salaries.59 But this was soon overshadowed by a much harsher rhetoric, 
which brought Babiš closer to the anti-immigration and anti-refugee views that pre-
vailed among the Czech population. In September 2015, he suggested that NaTO 
forces be deployed and the “empty boats of human traffickers be scuttled.”60 a year 
later in government, he opposed the plan to accept several dozen Syrian refugees 
from camps in Turkey, because he “disagrees with accepting any refugees, because 
this is an enormous risk, when you see the atrocities committed by some people who 
failed to receive asylum in germany.”61 a pronounced anti-refugee and anti-immi-
gration position has become an aNO staple and continued even as Babiš became 
prime minister at the turn of 2017 and 2018.
This mobilization sometimes attacked the eU, described by the aNO leader as 
unable to resolve the refugee crisis. In the context of aNO’s membership of aLDe, 
Babiš’s claim that “Czechs do not want to accept boundless multiculturalism dictated 
from Brussels” sounded a strange contrast.62
aNO’s MePs were more restrained in their positions on the refugee crisis, and 
this was evidently linked with the environment in which they worked. This was not 
initially apparent as far as the refugee quotas were concerned. all four aNO MePs 
voted against the european parliament resolution of 10 September 2015 on migration 
and refugees in europe. One of them, Martina Dlabajová, explained their position: 
“Together with my MeP colleagues Dita Charanzová, Petr Ježek and Pavel Telička, 
we understand the complex situation of refugees and the necessity of a common 
european response to the migration crisis in the Mediterranean. But we do not 
believe that national quotas are a suitable solution to this problem.”63
This position on migration was very different from that officially adopted by 
aLDe. However, Charanzová and Dlabajová were among the more moderate voices 
in aNO, aware of the humanitarian aspects of the conflict in the Middle east as well 
as the eU and Czech human rights obligations. Telička became even more remote 
from aNO’s domestic rhetoric. Though he rejected mandatory refugee quotas, he 
otherwise sought to present aLDe’s position as reasonable and essentially compati-
ble with Czech demands.64 He was one of the few aNO politicians indirectly to 
appreciate the humanistic position of Chancellor Merkel on resolving the refugee 
crisis.65 after Telička’s rupture with Babiš (which we will get to shortly), his opin-
ions shifted even closer to the aLDe position, and he became more critical of the 
Czech political mainstream. He described the Czech government’s resolution that 
strictly rejected any quotas as an irresponsible mistake and a weakening of the Czech 
position in the eU.66
This evident disagreement between the party leader and the eP group, shown here 
from materials related to the refugee crisis, had its consequences. In May 2017, 
Telička gave up the position of aNO foreign policy expert, and in October 2017 
announced the “end of his cooperation” with the party.67 another MeP, Petr Ježek, 
soon followed him. Telička blamed his departure on differences of opinion with 
Babiš on many programmatic aspects as well as particular cases:
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Unlike Mr Babiš, I am convinced that in many areas we cannot do without stronger 
european cooperation. . . . To put it simply: if aNO now rejects any further european 
integration, but three years ago we said something else in our manifesto—that is a very 
strong statement. Under such a divergence of opinion, I do not see the space for further 
collaboration.68
Beyond his disagreement with Babiš’s view of the eU, Telička noted aNO’s deci-
sion not to field a candidate to challenge President Miloš Zeman in the presidential 
election in early 2018. In many of their opinions on the eU and the refugee crisis, 
Babiš and Zeman sang from the same hymn sheet.
Testifying to the rupture between Telička and Babiš was the vote in the eP in 
September 2018 on a resolution to launch proceedings against Viktor Orbán’s 
Hungary for its serious breach of eU values. all four MePs originally elected on 
aNO’s ticket voted for the resolution. Babiš subsequently branded Telička and Ježek 
traitors, while Charanzová and Dlabajová were only asked to explain why they voted 
“against” Hungary. according to Babiš, the eU should return to its “original values”; 
because “we have these values, and if someone is saying something about Poland 
and Hungary and claims that I endanger democracy, then I must laugh about that.”69 
However, Charanzová and Dlabajová did not defect from aNO, and the two were at 
the top of the party’s candidate list for the 2019 european elections. given their 
experience and contacts, Babiš did not want to lose them.
If we compare Telička’s views with the priorities of the two parties’ manifestos as 
outlined above, we see that he distanced himself from aNO but remained confor-
mant with aLDe. Telička’s departure can be interpreted as part of a broader exodus 
of several more politicians from aNO in 2017 and 2018, who had founded the party 
alongside Babiš and whose profiles inclined towards liberalism as it is variously 
understood. This was a consequence of the positions taken by the party boss; the 
growing controversies surrounding his business empire; and the bizarre political alli-
ances into which he was pushed by these circumstances. In the Chamber of Deputies 
elected in 2017, aNO cooperated with the Communists and the far-right Freedom 
and Direct Democracy party. Since summer 2018, Babiš’s minority coalition govern-
ment has been dependent on the support of the Communists, which is seen by many 
Czechs in strongly negative terms, for historical reasons.
The European Liberals’ Reserve Towards Babiš’s Controversies
as time went by, the topic of andrej Babiš and his positions and problems 
gradually became less and less pleasant to the aLDe group, because it was being 
transferred into the european institutions, albeit not very visibly—until the 2019 
european elections. In early June 2017, an eP session discussed media abuse in 
Czechia in connection with Babiš—but only a few MePs were present. This was in 
part due to the fact that immediately before, following a government crisis, andrej 
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Babiš ceased to be a member of government for some time, and his main conflict of 
interests thus disappeared. Similarly, the (officially unpublished) 2018 report of the 
european anti-Fraud Office (OLaF) noted the misuse of a subsidy awarded to Stork 
Nest Farm—a matter over which Babiš was concurrently being criminally prose-
cuted in Czechia.
More explosive were the consequences in May 2019 of a preliminary audit by 
the european Commission (eC), which noted that Babiš had infringed the new 
financial regulation of the eU and his conflict of interests.70 In essence, this was 
about abusing political power to obtain european subsidies for his agrofert firms; 
the eC demanded a refund of the subsidies. although not public, the document 
was leaked. another preliminary eC audit concerned with other european subsi-
dies soon followed.
During the campaigning ahead of the spring 2019 european elections, aLDe 
found itself in an unpleasant situation. Using its electoral leader (the Spitzenkandidat), 
Verhofstadt, as its mouthpiece, the party criticized Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and his 
FIDeSZ party, and Sebastian Kurz and his austrian People’s Party—members of 
aLDe’s competitor, the ePP—as anti-european and anti-migration. But such an 
argument had a flaw that aLDe’s political opponents were quick to point out: aLDe 
had a similar problem with Babiš; indeed, because of his conflict of interests, aLDe’s 
problem was worse.
Before the 2019 election, it was not impossible that the liberal group in the eP 
would do without Babiš’s aNO. This possibility was signalled by the fact that aNO 
representatives were not invited for the mid-May 2019 meeting in Strasbourg of par-
ties that were preparing to launch the new eP group with the participation of 
emmanuel Macron’s La République en Marche!71 The only Czech to be invited was 
Telička, who stood for election to the eP with his own party, called Voice (Hlas). 
another signal was the distance from Babiš shown during campaigning by the previ-
ously accommodating Verhofstadt. Responding to the preliminary eC audit on sub-
sidy misuse, Verhofstadt said: “If andrej Babiš wants to remain in the new group that 
we are forming with . . . emmanuel Macron, he will have to abide fully by the 
european Commission’s assessment.”72
However, after the election, aNO was not ostracized from the new liberal group, 
called “Renew europe.” Supported by the group, aNO obtained several important 
posts, including a vice-presidency of the eP for Dita Charanzová. aNO scored worse 
than it expected in the elections. Still, it took 21 per cent of the vote, which was suf-
ficient for victory, including six of the twenty-one Czech MePs. Telička’s Voice, by 
contrast, failed to win a seat. The european Liberals showed no interest in negotiat-
ing with the Czech Pirate Party, which is very liberal especially in cultural matters 
and was successful in the eP elections (three MePs) and was interested in joining 
Renew europe. Renew europe’s position was probably influenced by the fact that 
Babiš was the Czech prime minister, which, obviously, is a bonus for a europarty in 
european politics.
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The decision of the new liberal eP group was not influenced by the massive wave 
of anti-Babiš rallies in Czechia in spring and summer 2019, the country’s largest 
since the 1989 toppling of communism. Likewise, Babiš’s questioning of the 
european Commission audits—calling the first of them “an attack against the Czech 
Republic”73—did not threaten aNO’s membership of Renew europe. Yet Babiš’s 
words confirmed his long-held views of european institutions.
Conclusion
Our research questions asked why aNO joined aLDe and why it remained in the 
liberal group despite increasing ideological and political divergences. We explained 
the key role of Telička, who as a kind of political broker connected aNO with 
aLDe, helped to select mostly pro-integration or neutral candidates to the eP, and 
helped to give the 2014 electoral manifesto at least a partly liberal profile. There was 
pragmatism on both sides, of course. aNO was strong enough to increase the size 
and potential of the aLDe parliamentary group and its chances of obtaining signifi-
cant positions in the eP (chairs of key committees, rapporteur positions, etc.). aLDe 
was also the only one of three mainstream political groups without any relevant 
Czech member and welcomed that the emerging aNO seemed to take moderate 
positions. Bressanelli added a set of good other reasons for “marriages of conveni-
ence”: national parties might better advance their interests in the european political 
arena within a strong and respected team.74 The positions held by aNO MePs (e.g., 
Telička as an eP vice president) confirm this benefit. Technically, member parties of 
larger groups have larger administrative resources since the eP rules reward larger 
groups and penalize smaller ones. Membership can also provide a source of legiti-
macy for national parties. Tim Haughton and Marek Rybář used the fitting expres-
sion “badge of approval”; this means enhanced domestic status gained through 
membership in a transnational grouping.75 However, using examples from Slovak 
parties, they showed mostly very limited influence of this external approval on inter-
nal party development—and exactly the same can be said about Babiš’s aNO.
We showed that in the five years after 2014, circumstances changed dramatically. 
aNO’s original ideological congruence with the economic and, to some extent, the 
cultural-societal positions of aLDe was replaced by the core aNO populist strategy 
based on technocracy. already during the refugee crisis and even more so around the 
time of the 2017 Czech parliamentary elections, this strategy led to a reinforcement 
of illiberal party elements. When we look at the positions of Babiš’s aNO on the 
most important political issues such as migration and Brexit, the illiberal and 
eurosceptic party agenda becomes clear. a comparison of manifestos and positions 
on the crucial conflicting european issues, such as the crises of greek debt and the 
eurozone, Brexit, and refugees, clearly reveals little ideological closeness between 
aLDe and aNO. Despite internal clashes between Babiš and some of aNO’s MePs, 
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and despite increasing ideological and political divergence, the aNO-aLDe alliance 
survived.
In the first years, the skills of aLDe’s main “point of contact” in Czechia, Telička, 
whose image made aNO’s membership credible, helped to bridge the distance. 
However, Telička the indomitable euro-optimist was not compatible with aNO’s 
flexible character in the long term. Babiš’s party has no qualms about accommodat-
ing the prevailing moods of the electorate, even if these turn out to be eurosceptic 
and entirely opposed to aLDe positions. We might explain Babiš’s extension of his 
technocratic-populist illiberal discourse by adding eurosceptic and nationalistic ele-
ments from the mid-2010s as a tactical step, intended to attract the attention of Czech 
voters. This biting discourse also dominated aNO’s campaign for the 2019 eP elec-
tions. Despite this fact, except for some tepid verbal warnings, the position of aNO 
within Renew europe, the eP group formed by aLDe and emmanuel Macron, was 
never questioned. The chance that aLDe/Renew europe will return aNO to a liberal 
track is therefore as slim as the probability that ePP will influence Orbán’s FIDeSZ. 
Moreover, so far, despite the crushing conclusions of the eC audits, neither the aNO 
leader’s conflict of interests nor accusations of subsidy fraud have proved fatal for 
aNO and aLDe cooperation. To sum up, aLDe simply acted as a hyper-pragmatic 
actor seeking to expand its number of seats in the eP at almost any cost.
an interesting question is why soft eurosceptic aNO insisted on cooperation with 
a party presenting a federalist view of european integration. We can divide the rea-
sons between those of “conjuncture” and those that are “structural.” among the con-
juncture reasons, there is the path dependency of the decision taken by Telička prior 
to the 2014 eP elections as well as the personal commitment of pro-integration MePs 
(Charanzová and Dlabajová), and the absence of any anti-eU voice among aNO’s 
representation in the eP. among structural reasons, we stress the specific position of 
eU-related issues in general and MePs in particular in Czech politics. There is a 
historical trend of a clear detachment of european from Czech politics. The MePs 
are neither very visible nor very important for the Czech political debate. european 
obligations and issues, save for some with high symbolic value and contentious 
potential such as migration, do not matter in the domestic debate.76 Participation in 
federalist Renew europe thus does not affect or compromise the image of aNO as a 
soft eurosceptic party “protecting Czechia strictly and without compromise.” To 
sum up, aNO “can afford” a pragmatic european alliance that is inconsistent with its 
position at home on european integration and enjoy the pragmatic advantage of that 
alliance within the eP.
The story of the relationship between aNO and aLDe might at first glance seem 
merely an amusing anecdote, of which there have been many throughout the history 
of integration into europarties of parties from eU-candidate and member states. We 
have shown some very peculiar nuances of this pragmatic alliance. at the beginning 
of this strange affair was aLDe’s offer, motivated by the need to bolster its own posi-
tion. The new Czech party, meanwhile, needed to anchor itself in european politics. 
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The fact that aNO was built on its leader’s technocratic view of the world, one that 
was hostile to liberalism, was not obvious initially; more importantly, it didn’t matter 
to the europarty. The example of aNO shows that the contemporary dynamics of the 
relations between europarties and national parties are determined much more by the 
arithmetic of the europarties’ eP seats than by ideological congruence. That being 
said, the relationship between aNO and aLDe is in a certain sense very peculiar. In 
many respects, aNO no longer has a weak or indeterminate position towards the 
europarty’s ideology, but is fundamentally opposed to it.
Bressanelli assumes that the number of “marriages of convenience” has increased 
because of parties coming from Central and eastern european member states. We 
showed that, despite the fact that aNO is a Czech political party, the reason for this 
“strange bedfellowship” lies not in the geopolitics of old and new members but in the 
specific nature of the centralizing structure and marketing techniques of communica-
tion of the entrepreneurial party.
Returning to the theoretical debate on the reasons why national parties join certain 
europarties, we can describe the alliance between aNO and aLDe as a kind of 
hyper-pragmatic cooperation. The project of eU reform inspired primarily by 
President Macron77 of France goes well with aLDe’s long-term political priorities. 
at the same time, it clearly contradicts the european discourse of andrej Babiš and 
aNO, as well as their political discourse in general. It seems that aLDe no longer 
demands even modest policy convergence or ideological proximity when accepting 
new members and when maintaining relations with existing ones. Purely pragmatic 
political strategic reasoning apparently has taken the lead. The reason for this lies not 
in some sort of “peculiar” Central and eastern european liberalism of aNO. aNO 
contradicts aLDe mainly because it is a quite different type of political party from 
the traditional members of the liberal famille spirituelle. aNO is a typical example of 
an entrepreneurial party,78 a type that does not treat ideology in any serious way and 
that changes its programme according to the most recent opinion polls and observa-
tions of the electoral market.
For the political entrepreneur—the focal point of an entrepreneurial party—the 
most important thing is to surf the waves of the topical and volatile moods of the 
electorate, and certainly not ideological consistency and continuity. With aLDe 
being the most open europarty—and, compared to ePP and PeS, the most member-
seeking one—a trend is revealed of an increasing number of entrepreneurial parties 
from various countries across europe coming to join it.
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